Energía Mundial IV y última Energy Renewables IV and last

La Energía en el Mundo

IV y última Parte

Energía Renovable

Les traemos aquí la última -pero no menos importante- parte del resumen ejecutivo de la Agencia Internacional de Energía 2013, y sus proyecciones hasta el año 2035. Aquí se trata de la participación que se proyecta para las energías renovables. A modo de enlace nos permitimos reproducir la última parte de la nota anterior, que hemos traducido al español: “La energía renovable explica casi la mitad del incremento en generación global de energía hasta el año 2035…”. Nadie puede no tener en cuenta que como toda proyección que supera ligeramente las dos décadas, existirán en ella supuestos que podrán no cumplirse. Dada la fuente y el enfoque de carácter global, nos interesan sobre todo, las tendencias que muy bien destaca este resumen ejecutivo que les hemos traído en cuatro etapas (con algún mínimo recorte en las primeras entregas por razones de espacio, por lo que les pedimos disculpas). Todo está en Internet para quienes quieran profundizar el tema. Muchas gracias.

Mauricio López Dardaine

“As the source of two-thirds of global greenhouse-gas emissions, the energy sector will be pivotal in determining whether or not climate change goals are achieved. “

Source: OECD/IEA, 2013

International Energy Agency

“Como fuente de los dos tercios de las emisiones globales de gases de efecto invernadero, el sector energético va a ser clave para determinar si se pueden alcanzar o no las metas en Cambio Climático” 

Energy Outlook – IV and last Part

Renewable Energy

Source: OECD/IEA, 2013

International Energy Agency

The power sector adjusts to a new life with wind and solar

Renewables account for nearly half of the increase in global power generation to 2035, with variable sources – wind and solar photo-voltaics – making up 45% of the expansion in renewables.

China sees the biggest absolute increase in generation from renewable sources, more than the increase in the European Union, the United States and Japan combined. In some markets, the rising share of variable renewables creates challenges in the power sector, raising fundamental questions about current market design and its ability to ensure adequate investment and long-term reliability of supply. The increase in generation from renewables takes its share in the global power mix above 30%, drawing ahead of natural gas in the next few years and all but reaching coal as the leading fuel for power generation in 2035. The current rate of construction of nuclear power plants has been slowed by reviews of safety regulations, but output from nuclear eventually increases by two-thirds, led by China, Korea, India and Russia. Widespread deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology would be a way to accelerate the anticipated decline in the CO2 emissions intensity of the power sector, but in our projections only around 1% of global fossil fuel-fired power plants are equipped with CCS by 2035.

La energía renovable explica casi la mitad del incremento en generación global de energía hasta el año 2035, con las fuentes variables -energías eólica y solar foto-voltaica- que componen el 45 % de la expansión de las fuentes renovables.

En nuestra proyección se observa en China el mayor aumento absoluto de generación de fuentes de energía renovable. Más que el aumento combinado de la Unión Europea, los Estados Unidos y el Japón. En algunos mercados, la participación creciente de las  renovables crea desafíos en el sector energético, planteando preguntas fundamentales respecto del diseño del actual mercado y su capacidad para asegurar inversiones adecuadas y confiabilidad de abastecimiento en el largo plazo.

El crecimiento de las energías renovables alcanza una participación superior al 30 % en el mix global de potencia energética, superando al gas natural en los próximos años y alcanzando prácticamente al carbón con combustible líder para generación de energía en 2035.

El ritmo actual de construcción de plantas nucleares ha sido atenuado por revisiones de las normas de seguridad, pero la producción nuclear finalmente aumenta dos tercios, liderada por China, Corea, la India y Rusia.

El uso generalizado de las tecnologías de captura y almacenaje de carbono constituiría una manera de reducir anticipadamente la intensidad de las emisiones de CO2 del sector energético, pero en nuestras proyecciones sólo un uno por ciento de las plantas de energía que utilizan combustibles fósiles, estarán dotadas de tecnología para captura y almacenamiento de carbono hacia el año 2035.

Economics and policies, in different doses, are key to the outlook for coal and gas

Coal remains a cheaper option than gas for generating electricity in many regions, but policy interventions to improve efficiency, curtail local air pollution and mitigate climate change will be critical in determining its longer-term prospects. Policy choices in China, which has outlined plans to cap the share of coal in total energy use, will be particularly important as China now uses as much coal as the rest of the world combined. In our central scenario, global coal demand increases by 17% to 2035, with two-thirds of the increase occurring by 2020. Coal use declines in OECD countries. By contrast, coal demand expands by one-third in non-OECD countries – predominantly in India, China and Southeast Asia – despite China reaching a plateau around 2025. India, Indonesia and China account for 90% of the growth in coal production. Export demand makes Australia the only OECD country to register substantial growth in output.

Market conditions vary strikingly in different regions of the world, but the flexibility and environmental benefits of natural gas compared with other fossil fuels put it in a position to prosper over the longer term. Growth is strongest in emerging markets, notably China, where gas use quadruples by 2035, and in the Middle East. But in the European Union, gas remains squeezed between a growing share of renewables and a weak competitive position versus coal in power generation, and consumption struggles to return to 2010 levels. North America continues to benefit from ample production of unconventional gas, with a small but significant share of this gas finding its way to other markets as LNG, contributing – alongside other conventional and unconventional developments in East Africa, China, Australia and elsewhere – to more diversity in global gas supply. New connections between markets act as a catalyst for changes in the way that gas is priced, including more widespread adoption of hub-based pricing.

Brazil is at the leading edge of deepwater and low-carbon development

Brazil, the special focus country in this year’s Outlook, is set to become a major exporter of oil and a leading global energy producer. Based mainly on a series of recent offshore discoveries, Brazil’s oil production triples to reach 6 mb/d in 2035, accounting for one-third of the net growth in global oil production and making Brazil the world’s sixth-largest producer. Natural gas production grows more than five-fold, enough to cover all of the country’s domestic needs by 2030, even as these expand significantly. The increase in oil and gas production is dependent on highly complex and capital-intensive deepwater developments, requiring levels of upstream investment beyond those of either the Middle East or Russia. A large share of this will need to come from Petrobras, the national oil company, whose mandated role in developing strategic fields places heavy weight on its ability to deploy resources effectively across a huge and varied investment programme. Commitments made to source goods and services locally within Brazil add tension to a tightly stretched supply chain.

Brazil’s abundant and diverse energy resources underpin an 80% increase in its energy use, including the achievement of universal access to electricity. Rising consumption is driven by the energy needs of an expanding middle class, resulting in strong growth in demand for transport fuels and a doubling of electricity consumption. Meeting this demand requires substantial and timely investment throughout the energy system – $90 billion per year on average. The system of auctions for new electricity generation and transmission capacity will be vital in bringing new capital to the power sector and in reducing pressure on end-user prices. The development of a well-functioning gas market, attractive to new entrants, can likewise help spur investment and improve the competitive position of Brazilian industry. A stronger policy focus on energy efficiency would ease potential strains on a rapidly growing energy system.

Brazil’s energy sector remains one of the least carbon-intensive in the world, despite greater availability and use of fossil fuels.

Brazil is already a world-leader in renewable energy and is set to almost double its output from renewables by 2035, maintaining their 43% share of the domestic energy mix. Hydropower remains the backbone of the power sector. Yet reliance on hydropower declines, in part because of the remoteness and environmental sensitivity of a large part of the remaining resource, much of which is in the Amazon region. Among the fuels with a rising share in the power mix, onshore wind power, which is already proving to be competitive, natural gas and electricity generated from bioenergy take the lead. In the transport sector, Brazil is already the world’s second-largest producer of biofuels and its production, mainly as sugarcane ethanol, more than triples. Suitable cultivation areas are more than sufficient to accommodate this increase without encroaching on environmentally sensitive areas. By 2035, Brazilian biofuels meet almost one-third of domestic demand for road-transport fuel and its net exports account for about 40% of world biofuels trade.



Parques Eólicos en la Argentina

Lista de Parques Eólicos en funcionamiento en LA Argentina

ACTUALIZADO A OCTUBRE DE 2013

Fuente: blog del Ing. Jorge Ignacio Andreotti

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·        Jorge Romanotti, en Pico Truncado, Provincia de Santa Cruz, de 2,4 MW, perteneciente a la municipalidad de la ciudad y con tipo de distribución a la red local y a la red patagónica. En marcha desde mayo de 2005.

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·        Antonio Morán, en Comodoro Rivadavia, Provincia de Chubut, de 17,06 MW, perteneciente a Pecorsa y a la cooperativa eléctrica SCPL y con tipo de distribución local. En marcha desde diciembre de 2001.

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·        Rada Tilly, en Rada Tilly y Río Mayo, en la Provincia de Chubut, de 0,61 MW, perteneciente a la cooperativa de servicios de Rada Tilly (COAGUA) y con tipo de distribución local. En marcha desde 1996.

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·        Tandil, en Tandil, Provincia de Buenos Aires, de 0,8 MW, perteneciente a la Cooperativa Rural Eléctrica de Tandil - Azul  Lda (CRETAL) y con tipo de distribución local. En marcha desde 1998

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·        Punta Alta, en Punta Alta, Provincia de Buenos Aires, de 2,2 MW, perteneciente a la Cooperativa Eléctrica de Punta Alta(CEPA) y con tipo de distribución local. En marcha desde 1998.

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·        Cutral Có, en Cutral Có,  Provincia de Neuquén, de 0,4 MW, perteneciente a la cooperativa eléctrica de Cutral Có y con tipo de distribución local. En marcha desde 1994.

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·        Claromecó, en Claromecó, Provincia de Buenos Aires, de 0,75 MW, perteneciente a la cooperativa eléctrica de Claromecó y con tipo de distribución local. En marcha desde 1999.

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·        Darregueira, en Darregueira, Provincia de Buenos Aires, de 0,75 MW, perteneciente a la cooperativa eléctrica de Darregueira y con tipo de distribución local. En marcha desde 1997.

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·        Mayor Buratovich, en Mayor Buratovich, Provincia de Buenos Aires, de 1,2 MW, perteneciente a la cooperativa eléctrica de Mayor Buratovich y con tipo de distribución local. En marcha desde 1997.

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·        General Acha, en General Acha, Provincia de La Pampa, de 1,8 MW, perteneciente a la cooperativa de servicios públicos de General Acha(COSEGA) y con tipo de distribución local. En marcha desde 2004.

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·        Arauco- S.A.P.E.M, en la Provincia de La Rioja, de 25,2 MW, perteneciente al Gobierno dela Prov. de La Rioja y ENARSA y con tipo de  distribución al sistema argentino de interconexión. En marcha desde 2011.

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·        Parque Eólico Rawson I y II, en la Provincia de Chubut, de 80 MW, perteneciente a EMGASUD y ENARSA y con tipo de distribución al sistema argentino de interconexión. En marcha desde enero de 2012.

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·        Diadema, en la Provincia de Chubut, de 6,3MW, perteneciente a  Hychiko S.A  y con tipo de  distribución al sistema argentino de interconexión. En marcha desde 2011.

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·        Necochea, en Necochea, Provincia de Buenos Aires, de 0,3MW, perteneciente a Sea Energy S.A. y con tipo de  distribución al sistema argentino de interconexión. En marcha desde 2010.

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·        El Tordillo, en la Provincia de Chubut, de 3MW, perteneciente a ENARSA y a la Prov. de Chubut. En marcha desde 2009

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·        Loma Blanca IV, en la Provincia de Chubut, de 51MW, perteneciente a Isolux Corsan S.A. y con tipo de distribución al sistema argentino de interconexión.  En marcha desde agosto de 2013.

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·        Veladero, en la Provincia de San Juan, de 2MW, perteneciente a Barrick. En marcha desde 2008

La Energía en el Mundo III World Energy Outlook III

La Energía en el Mundo

III Parte

Mauricio López Dardaine

Es indudable que el tema de los hold-outs ocupa gran parte de los pensamientos de los argentinos en este inicio del invierno austral. Interesa, no obstante,  poder mirar un poco más allá. Y mirar más allá significa pensar para nuestro país en un desarrollo que sea ético y sustentable. Para su desarrollo la Argentina cuenta con una serie de recursos nada desdeñables: un campo tecnificado, reservas hídricas considerables, recursos mineros importantes y reservas abundantes de shale-gas y shale-oil. Ello en un mundo ávido por todos los bienes mencionados.

Anoche, en el programa de Mariano Grondona, el agudo analista Jorge Castro reiteró varias veces durante su participación, que en política internacional “lo que realmente interesa es lo que un gobernante hace”. Y agregaba lo vital que resultaba para la Argentina cerrar el ciclo de acuerdos ya logrados con Repsol y el Club de París, justamente pensando en los recursos mencionados arriba, con el fin de poder encauzar las inversiones necesarias. Su enfoque pragmático prescindió de cualquier tipo de colorido político. En el mismo sentido queremos orientar este tercer comentario sobre la Energía.

Puesto que nuestro creciente déficit energético es una de las causas (no la única) de los problemas económicos presentes, interesa para los que no somos especialistas en energía, ir redondeando una primera idea sobre el panorama mundial. Ello nos permitirá luego encuadrar la importancia de Vaca Muerta, y entender mejor la reciente visita del enviado especial del Presidente Obama a la Argentina para hablar de petróleo y de gas.

A quienes nos interesa (egoístamente) el futuro de nuestro Planeta Tierra -futuro al que está irremediablemente sujeto el de la Argentina- debemos recordar la frase con que hemos encabezado las dos notas anteriores:

“As the source of two-thirds of global greenhouse-gas emissions, the energy sector will be pivotal in determining whether or not climate change goals are achieved. “

Source: OECD/IEA, 2013

International Energy Agency

“Como fuente de los dos tercios de las emisiones globales de gases de efecto invernadero, el sector energético va a ser clave para determinar si se pueden alcanzar o no las metas en Cambio Climático”  

Energy Outlook – Part III

Source: OECD/IEA, 2013

International Energy Agency

From the 2013 executive summary of the International Energy Agency:

The need to compensate for declining output from existing oil fields is the major driver for upstream oil investment to 2035.

Our analysis of more than 1 600 fields confirms that, once production has peaked, an average conventional field can expect to see annual declines in output of around 6% per year. While this figure varies according to the type of field, the implication is that conventional crude output from existing fields is set to fall by more than 40 mb/d by 2035. Among the other sources of oil, most unconventional plays are heavily dependent on continuous drilling to prevent rapid field-level declines. Of the 790 billion barrels of total production required to meet our projections for demand to 2035, more than half is needed just to offset declining production.

Demand for mobility and for petrochemicals keeps oil use on an upward trend to 2035, although the pace of growth slows.

The decline in oil use in OECD countries accelerates. China overtakes the United States as the largest oil-consuming country and Middle East oil consumption overtakes that of the European Union, both around 2030. The shifting geography of demand is further underlined by India becoming the largest single source of global oil demand growth after 2020. Oil consumption is concentrated in just two sectors by 2035: transport and petrochemicals. Transport oil demand rises by 25% to reach 59 mb/d, with one-third of the increase going to fuel road freight in Asia. In petrochemicals, the Middle East, China and North America help push up global oil use for feedstocks to 14 mb/d. High prices encourage efficiency improvements and undercut the position of oil wherever alternatives are readily available, with bio-fuels and natural gas gaining some ground as transport fuels.

The great migration in oil refining and trade

Major changes in the composition of oil supply and demand confront the world’s refiners with an ever-more complex set of challenges, and not all of them are well-equipped to survive.

Rising output of natural gas liquids, bio-fuels and coal- or gas-to-liquids technologies means that a larger share of liquid fuels reaches consumers without having to pass through the refinery system. Refiners nonetheless need to invest to meet a surge of more than 5 mb/d in demand for diesel that is almost triple the increase in gasoline use. The shift in the balance of oil consumption towards Asia and the Middle East sees a continued build-up of refining capacity in these regions; but, in many OECD countries, declining demand and competition in product export markets intensify pressure to shut capacity. Over the period to 2035, we estimate that nearly 10 mb/d of global refinery capacity is at risk, with refineries in OECD countries, and Europe in particular, among the most vulnerable.

The new geography of demand and supply means a re-ordering of global oil trade flows towards Asian markets, with implications for co-operative efforts to ensure oil security.

The net North American requirement for crude imports all but disappears by 2035 and the region becomes a larger exporter of oil products. Asia becomes the unrivalled centre of global oil trade as the region draws in – via a limited number of strategic transport routes – a rising share of the available crude oil. Deliveries to Asia come not only from the Middle East (where total crude exports start to fall short of Asian import requirements) but also from Russia, the Caspian, Africa, Latin America and Canada. New export-oriented refinery capacity in the Middle East raises the possibility that oil products, rather than crude, take a larger share of global trade, but much of this new capacity eventually serves to cater to increasing demand from within the region itself.

The power sector adjusts to a new life with wind and solar

Renewables account for nearly half of the increase in global power generation to 2035, with variable sources – wind and solar photo-voltaics – making up 45% of the expansion in renewables.

China sees the biggest absolute increase in generation from renewable sources, more than the increase in the European Union, the United States and Japan combined. In some markets, the rising share of variable renewables creates challenges in the power sector, raising fundamental questions about current market design and its ability to ensure adequate investment and long-term reliability of supply. The increase in generation from renewables takes its share in the global power mix above 30%, drawing ahead of natural gas in the next few years and all but reaching coal as the leading fuel for power generation in 2035. The current rate of construction of nuclear power plants has been slowed by reviews of safety regulations, but output from nuclear eventually increases by two-thirds, led by China, Korea, India and Russia. Widespread deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology would be a way to accelerate the anticipated decline in the CO2 emissions intensity of the power sector, but in our projections only around 1% of global fossil fuel-fired power plants are equipped with CCS by 2035.

To be continued.

Part II - Energy Outlook - II L'Énergie Mondiale - II La Energia en el Mundo

The Energy Outlook

Part II

“As the source of two-thirds of global greenhouse-gas emissions, the energy sector will be pivotal in determining whether or not climate change goals are achieved. “

Source: OECD/IEA, 2013

International Energy Agency

9 rue de la Fédération

75739 Paris Cedex 15, France

www.iea.org



Me parece especialmente importante un párrafo que abre una ventana a la esperanza:

  

"Enhancing energy competitiveness does not mean diminishing efforts to tackle climate change."

Realzar la competitividad energética no significa disminuir los esfuerzos para abordar el cambio climático.  

"The WEO Special Report: Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map, published in June 2013 identified four pragmatic measures – improving efficiency, limiting the construction and use of the least-efficient coal-fired power plants, minimising methane emissions in upstream oil and gas, and reforming fossil-fuel subsidies – that could halt the increase in emissions by 2020 without harming economic growth."

El informe especial del WEO (World Energy Outlook – Panorama Energético Mundial) Redibujando el Mapa Clima-Energía publicado en junio de 2013, identifica cuatro medidas pragmáticas: mejorar la eficiencia energética, limitar la construcción y empleo de las menos eficientes plantas de energía en base a carbón, minimizar las emisiones de metano en las instalaciones upstream de petróleo y gas y reformar los subsidios a los combustibles fósiles. Todo lo cual podría detener el incremento de emisiones [de gases de efecto invernadero] hacia 2020, y hacerlo sin afectar el crecimiento económico.

 

For our French readers we also add the second part of the analysis of Le Monde’s blogger Matthieu Auzanneau, « Pétrole : hormis les non-conventionnels américains, la production mondiale a baissé en 2013 » (« Oil : except for US non-conventionals, world production in 2013 has decreased »)

Mauricio López Dardaine

From the 2013 executive summary of the International Energy Agency:

Who has the energy to compete?

Energy price variations are set to affect industrial competitiveness, influencing investment decisions and company strategies. While regional differences in natural gas prices narrow in our central scenario, they nonetheless remain large through to 2035 and, in most cases, electricity price differentials persist. In many emerging economies, particularly in Asia, strong growth in domestic demand for energy-intensive goods supports a swift rise in their production (accompanied by export expansion). But relative energy costs play a more decisive role in shaping developments elsewhere. The United States sees a slight increase in its share of global exports of energy-intensive goods, providing the clearest indication of the link between relatively low energy prices and the industrial outlook. By contrast, the European Union and Japan both see a strong decline in their export shares – a combined loss of around one-third of their current share.

Searching for an energy boost to the economy

Countries can reduce the impact of high prices by promoting more efficient, competitive and interconnected energy markets. Cost differentials between regional gas markets could be narrowed further by more rapid movement towards a global gas market. As we examine in a Gas Price Convergence Case, this would require a loosening of the current rigidity of liquefied natural gas (LNG) contracting structures and oil-indexed pricing mechanisms spurred by accelerated gas market reforms in the Asia-Pacific region and LNG exports from North America (and an easing of costs for LNG liquefaction and shipping). There is also potential in some regions, notably China, parts of Latin America and even parts of Europe, to replicate at smaller scale the US success in developing its unconventional gas resources, though uncertainty remains over the quality of the resources, the costs of their production and, in some countries, public acceptance for their development.

A renewed focus on energy efficiency is taking hold and is set to deliver benefits that extend well beyond improvements in competitiveness. Notable policies introduced over the past year include measures targeting efficiency improvements in buildings in Europe and Japan, in motor vehicles in North America and in air conditioners in parts of the Middle East, and energy pricing reforms in China and India. As well as bringing down costs for industry, efficiency measures mitigate the impact of energy prices on household budgets (the share of energy in household spending has reached very high levels in the European Union) and on import bills (the share of energy imports in Japan’s GDP has risen sharply). But the potential for energy efficiency is still far from exhausted: two-thirds of the economic potential of energy efficiency is set to remain untapped in our central scenario. Action is needed to break down the various barriers to investment in energy efficiency. This includes phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies, which we estimate rose to $544 billion worldwide in 2012.

Enhancing energy competitiveness does not mean diminishing efforts to tackle climate change.

The WEO Special Report: Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map, published in June 2013 identified four pragmatic measures – improving efficiency, limiting the construction and use of the least-efficient coal-fired power plants, minimising methane emissions in upstream oil and gas, and reforming fossil-fuel subsidies – that could halt the increase in emissions by 2020 without harming economic growth. This package of measures would complement the developments already envisaged in our central scenario, notably the rise in deployment of renewable energy technologies. Governments need, though, to be attentive to the design of their subsidies to renewables, which surpassed $100 billion in 2012 and expand to $220 billion in 2035. As renewables become increasingly competitive on their own merits, it is important that subsidy schemes allow for the multiple benefits of low-carbon energy sources without placing excessive burdens on those that cover the additional costs. A carefully conceived international climate change agreement can help to ensure that the energy-intensive industries in countries that act decisively to limit emissions do not face unequal competition from countries that do not.

Hormis les non-conventionnels américains,
la production mondiale a baissé en 2013

2^ème Partie

Source : Matthieu Auzanneau, “Oil Man”, Le Monde’s, juin 2014.

De nouveaux indices apparaissent à l'examen des chiffres de la production mondiale 2013 publiés par Washington. Le bilan de l'année passée est l'occasion de comparer à nouveau le verre à moitié vide au verre à moitié plein.

Le verre à moitié plein, d'abord. A première vue, 2013 semble avoir été un cru honnête pour Big Oil. Après un solide rebond en 2012 (le plus fort en dix ans après celui du lendemain de la guerre d'Irak), le flot mondial de pétrole brut pompé tout autour du globe, en dehors des agrocarburants et autres pétroles de synthèses, s'est maintenu et même très légèrement accru l'an dernier : + 0,2 % selon Washington, soit un peu plus de 76 millions de barils par jour.

Qui l'eût cru ? Le premier, le plus vieux des pays de l'or noir, celui-là même dont la production sénescente menaçait d'entraîner dans sa propre chute la totalité des extractions mondiales, serait en passe de sauver la planète pétrole. Sacrés Américains, ils ne pouvaient faire moins qu'un retournement de situation hollywoodien. La cavalerie yankee charge contre tout espoir à la dernière minute, et de même, grâce au pétrole de schiste et à la fracturation hydraulique, l'industrie pétrolière nord-américaine réussit pour l'heure à se ressusciter.

Mais gare, un vicieux canyon se dresse sur le chemin du retour. Big Oil pourrait s'avérer être comme Le Coyote poursuivant en vain Bip Bip, et qui sourit juste avant de comprendre qu'il a les pieds dans le vide.

Le pétrole de schiste (pétrole de roche-mère à plus proprement parler) constitue avec les sables bitumineux du Canada l'une des deux sources de pétroles extrêmes et non-conventionnels dont de nombreux industriels, en France par exemple le directeur scientifique de Total, assurent qu'ils permettront de compenser le déclin des vieux champs de pétrole conventionnel, renvoyant du même coup les Cassandre à leurs chères études.

Deux nouvelles récentes donnent une perspective différente sur le gonflement spectaculaire du flot des pétroles extrêmes et non-conventionnels en provenance d'Amérique du Nord :

1- Les pétroles de roche-mère aux Etats-Unis. Dans son dernier rapport annuel, l'administration Obama de l'énergie persiste une fois encore à doucher le discours volontariste de l'industrie, en soutenant que le boom du pétrole de roche-mère à de grandes chances d'être terminé dans deux ans. A noter dans le graphe qui suit, publié en mai par Washington, le large écart entre le scénario de référence et le scénario "optimiste", fondé sur une hypothèse haute de ressources récupérables :

L'avenir présagé du développement du pétrole de roche-mère est empreint de grandes incertitudes. Certains experts jusqu'ici rangés parmi les "pessimistes" estiment que le boom des "schistes", aux Etats-Unis et bientôt ailleurs, ne fait que commencer. Ces mêmes experts, toutefois, jugent qu'un tel boom, aussi impressionnant soit-il, ne suffira pas à combler longtemps le déclin de la production existante de pétrole conventionnel, et par là à reculer la date du pic pétrolier.

L'un de ces experts, le géologue britannique Richard Miller, ancien prospectiviste de la compagnie BP et auteur d'une analyse remarquée publiée en janvier par la Royal Society à Londres, déclare au Guardian :

« Nous sommes probablement au pic pétrolier aujourd'hui, ou au moins sur ses contreforts. »