Y decimos que es sólo abriendo estas posiciones en posiciones de ocho dígitos, llegando luego en varios casos a los diez dígitos y agregando los respectivos ex-outs (en la Argentina conocidos como posiciones SIM), que se puede uno sentar tranquilo a la mesa de negociaciones sabiendo realmente de qué se está hablando.
Esta tarea, no sencilla pero indispensable, es especialmente importante en el caso de los países en vías de desarrollo, que son aquellos a quienes se les exige abrir sus mercados -eliminar sus aranceles de importación- respecto de todas estas posiciones de "bienes ambientales".
El debate no es nuevo. Lo que decimos nosotros es que dicho debate puede hacerse más transparente (creemos haberlo demostrado para los casos de la Argentina y el Brasil a partir de nuestros trabajos de 2006 en adelante, estudios que contaron con el patrocinio de ICTSD de Ginebra). No parece honesto decir hoy que no puede saberse qué contiene cada posición en una lista de negociación de Bienes Ambientales. Se trata de poner manos a la obra armados de las herramientas y los conocimientos adecuados.
Mauricio López Dardaine
Encore une fois, un groupe de pays membres de l'OMC met sur la table des négociations une liste de ce qu'on appelle biens environnementaux. Dans ce commentaire, que nous vous apportons, d'une part il y-a une contribution très intéressante d'Aaron Cosbey du IISD; c'est quelqu'un qui suit ces questions depuis longtemps. Et également une synthèse de ce que notre groupe de l'Estudio López Dardaine a étudié, surtout pour l'Argentine et le Brésil, depuis 2006, sur cette question si délicate qui est : Que représentent les positions sur ces listes de négociation lors qu'elles sont exprimées au niveau de six chiffres sur la nomenclature tarifaire ?
Positions que, comme il ressort de cette analyse à laquelle nous nous référons -question aujourd'hui largement connue- masquent de nombreux biens qui sont en fait industriels, même si ces biens peuvent aussi fournir certaines fonctions qui sont aussi environnementales.
C'est seulement en ouvrant ces positions en positions à huit chiffres, puis arrivant dans plusieurs cas au niveau des dix chiffres et en ajoutant les ex-outs respectifs (en Argentine appelés positions SIM), que vous pouvez vous s'asseoir à la table des négociations et savoir vraiment de quoi il s'agit. Cette tâche, qui n'est pas simple, mais qui est indispensable, est particulièrement importante dans le cas des pays en développement, qui sont ceux qui sont tenus d'ouvrir leurs marchés - éliminer ses taxes à l'importation - pour toutes ces positions de « biens environnementaux ».
Le débat n'est pas nouveau. Ce que nous souhaitons c'est que ce débat puisse devenir plus transparent ; nous pensons l'avoir démontré pour les cas de l'Argentine et le Brésil moyennant nos études à partir de 2006.
Il n'est pas honnête de dire aujourd'hui que vous ne pouvez pas savoir ce que contient chaque position dans une liste des négociations de biens environnementaux. Il s'agit de se mettre à la tâche armé avec les outils et les connaissances nécessaires.
Environmental Goods once more approach the negotiating table
Mauricio López Dardaine
Once more, the negotiation of “Environmental Goods” appears to be launched on the initiative of fourteen countries, gathered at the time of the Davos meeting. Before sharing with you the essence of the very apt comments by Aaron Cosbey of IISD, let me tell you briefly about the angle concerning tariffs, even if tariffs appear to be only one of the issues involved. For when dealing with the WTO, tariffs are to be taken very carefully into consideration by all parties.
Especially from the point of view of developing countries, the negotiation of environmental goods is faced with the problem of tariff classification.
For when you work at the six digit level, as these lists are usually expressed, many a tariff position for an environmental good also covers (masks) a number of goods that are not actually environmental. If, say, chlorine is defined as environmental because it is used in connection with water treatment, what about chlorine when used as a chemical raw material?
Now, when you convert these six digit positions into eight digits ones, some of the environmental goods become better defined, other eight digit positions still mask goods that are not environmental.
It is only when you take the trouble to work with a higher level of definition, say ten digits (and this varies from country to country) or you analyse ex-outs, that you are able to begin to define most environmental goods, not all but most, and you are able to sit at the negotiating table, from the point of view of tariff positions, knowing what you are actually talking about.
Some countries are extremely reluctant to address environmental goods taking all this into consideration.
We have done (in 2006, 2007 and 2009) in depth work on the subject taking examples from studies carried out by our consulting group in Brazil and Argentina, and also presented the first two of these studies in Geneva with attendance from WTO representatives. In this endeavour we have been supported by ICTSD. We are of course aware that tariff classification often becomes outdated and tariff modification is a slow process.
This said we would like to acquaint you withsome of the views of Aaron Cosbey, under “The Green Goods Agreement: neither green nor good?”
© 2014 The International Institute for Sustainable Development
Published by the International Institute for Sustainable Development.
“On the margins of this year’s World Economic Forum in Davos, 14 countries launched plurilateral negotiations on liberalizing trade in so-called environmental goods. The talks will build from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) list of 54 green goods slated for preferential tariff treatment within that trading block. While the intent is welcome, the agreement will do little for the environment and will present a morass of challenges for the parties involved.
The agreement is touted as benefiting the environment, but if it follows the APEC model and just focuses on tariffs—which is the short-term plan—then it will not address the real obstacles to trade in these goods. Primary among these are countervail and anti-dumping policies (a fast-growing category in the renewable energy sector), weak intellectual property regimes and a host of non-trade policy variables to which investors are sensitive. Among these variables are national laws and regulations for employment of the technologies, tight financing and a lack of national environmental policies that create the demand for such goods.
Most of the negotiating countries already assess low or zero tariffs on most green goods, with a few notable outliers. In a 2009 paper, my colleague Peter Wooders calculates that the maximum conceivable greenhouse gas reduction possible from liberalization (using the much larger list of 153 goods proposed in the World Trade Organization [WTO] talks), under impossibly optimistic assumptions, would be between 0.1 and 0.9 per cent of 2030 total greenhouse gas emissions. Tariffs just are not that important here.
Is the agreement advisable from the trade regime’s perspective? That’s complicated. It is good that these countries have taken the initiative to move beyond the impasse that is the Doha Round, and good that they seem to care enough about the environment to choose a green goods agreement as a first exploratory step in that sort of coping strategy. However, they have entered a minefield, seemingly blind to the challenges…
Most important to a green goods agreement would be a mechanism that regularly assessed the items on the list, performing three functions:
Listing: deciding which entirely new green items deserved listing.
Delisting: deciding which were no longer “green” relative to the competition (e.g., compact fluorescent lights, in the face of environmentally superior LEDs).
Revising: deciding which performance standards needed ratcheting up, in light of improving technology (e.g., automobile fuel-efficiency standards)…”
